The Assembly of a New World Order
The concept that has underpinned the modern geopolitical era is in crisis
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Libya is in civil war, fundamentalist
armies are building a self-declared caliphate across Syria and Iraq and
Afghanistan's young democracy is on the verge of paralysis. To these
troubles are added a resurgence of tensions with Russia and a
relationship with China divided between pledges of cooperation and
public recrimination. The concept of order that has underpinned the
modern era is in crisis.
The search for
world order has long been defined almost exclusively by the concepts of
Western societies. In the decades following World War II, the
U.S.—strengthened in its economy and national confidence—began to take
up the torch of international leadership and added a new dimension. A
nation founded explicitly on an idea of free and representative
governance, the U.S. identified its own rise with the spread of liberty
and democracy and credited these forces with an ability to achieve just
and lasting peace. The traditional European approach to order had viewed
peoples and states as inherently competitive; to constrain the effects
of their clashing ambitions, it relied on a balance of power and a
concert of enlightened statesmen. The prevalent American view considered
people inherently reasonable and inclined toward peaceful compromise
and common sense; the spread of democracy was therefore the overarching
goal for international order. Free markets would uplift individuals,
enrich societies and substitute economic interdependence for traditional
international rivalries.
This effort to establish world order has in
many ways come to fruition. A plethora of independent sovereign states
govern most of the world's territory. The spread of democracy and
participatory governance has become a shared aspiration if not a
universal reality; global communications and financial networks operate
in real time.
The years from perhaps
1948 to the turn of the century marked a brief moment in human history
when one could speak of an incipient global world order composed of an
amalgam of American idealism and traditional European concepts of
statehood and balance of power. But vast regions of the world have never
shared and only acquiesced in the Western concept of order. These
reservations are now becoming explicit, for example, in the Ukraine
crisis and the South China Sea. The order established and proclaimed by
the West stands at a turning point.
First,
the nature of the state itself—the basic formal unit of international
life—has been subjected to a multitude of pressures. Europe has set out
to transcend the state and craft a foreign policy based primarily on the
principles of soft power. But it is doubtful that claims to legitimacy
separated from a concept of strategy can sustain a world order. And
Europe has not yet given itself attributes of statehood, tempting a
vacuum of authority internally and an imbalance of power along its
borders. At the same time, parts of the Middle East have dissolved into
sectarian and ethnic components in conflict with each other; religious
militias and the powers backing them violate borders and sovereignty at
will, producing the phenomenon of failed states not controlling their
own territory.
The challenge in Asia is
the opposite of Europe's: Balance-of-power principles prevail unrelated
to an agreed concept of legitimacy, driving some disagreements to the
edge of confrontation.
The clash between
the international economy and the political institutions that
ostensibly govern it also weakens the sense of common purpose necessary
for world order. The economic system has become global, while the
political structure of the world remains based on the nation-state.
Economic globalization, in its essence, ignores national frontiers.
Foreign policy affirms them, even as it seeks to reconcile conflicting
national aims or ideals of world order.
This
dynamic has produced decades of sustained economic growth punctuated by
periodic financial crises of seemingly escalating intensity: in Latin
America in the 1980s; in Asia in 1997; in Russia in 1998; in the U.S. in
2001 and again starting in 2007; in Europe after 2010. The winners have
few reservations about the system. But the losers—such as those stuck
in structural misdesigns, as has been the case with the European Union's
southern tier—seek their remedies by solutions that negate, or at least
obstruct, the functioning of the global economic system.
The
international order thus faces a paradox: Its prosperity is dependent
on the success of globalization, but the process produces a political
reaction that often works counter to its aspirations.
A
third failing of the current world order, such as it exists, is the
absence of an effective mechanism for the great powers to consult and
possibly cooperate on the most consequential issues. This may seem an
odd criticism in light of the many multilateral forums that exist—more
by far than at any other time in history. Yet the nature and frequency
of these meetings work against the elaboration of long-range strategy.
This process permits little beyond, at best, a discussion of pending
tactical issues and, at worst, a new form of summitry as "social media"
event. A contemporary structure of international rules and norms, if it
is to prove relevant, cannot merely be affirmed by joint declarations;
it must be fostered as a matter of common conviction.
The
penalty for failing will be not so much a major war between states
(though in some regions this remains possible) as an evolution into
spheres of influence identified with particular domestic structures and
forms of governance. At its edges, each sphere would be tempted to test
its strength against other entities deemed illegitimate. A struggle
between regions could be even more debilitating than the struggle
between nations has been.
The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the
various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another.
These goals are not necessarily self-reconciling: The triumph of a
radical movement might bring order to one region while setting the stage
for turmoil in and with all others. The domination of a region by one
country militarily, even if it brings the appearance of order, could
produce a crisis for the rest of the world.
A
world order of states affirming individual dignity and participatory
governance, and cooperating internationally in accordance with
agreed-upon rules, can be our hope and should be our inspiration. But
progress toward it will need to be sustained through a series of
intermediary stages.
To play a
responsible role in the evolution of a 21st-century world order, the
U.S. must be prepared to answer a number of questions for itself: What
do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone?
What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage
in, even if urged on by a multilateral group or an alliance? What is
the nature of the values that we seek to advance? And how much does the
application of these values depend on circumstance?
For
the U.S., this will require thinking on two seemingly contradictory
levels. The celebration of universal principles needs to be paired with
recognition of the reality of other regions' histories, cultures and
views of their security. Even as the lessons of challenging decades are
examined, the affirmation of America's exceptional nature must be
sustained. History offers no respite to countries that set aside their
sense of identity in favor of a seemingly less arduous course. But nor
does it assure success for the most elevated convictions in the absence
of a comprehensive geopolitical strategy.
Reposted from The Wall Street Journal.